Fraunhofer AISEC

HARRIS Workshop 2024


Exploring Netlist Reverse Engineering Benchmarks: Existing Approaches and Future Requirements


## **Netlist Analysis**

The "final" step in hardware reverse engineering

### **Possible Goals:**

- Recovery of high-level functionality
- Hardware Trojan detection
- Breaking (netlist) obfuscation






### **Functionality Recovery:**

"Divide and Conquer approach"

- 1. Partition
- 2. Identify functionality (by comparison)





## **Circuit Benchmarks**

### Why do we need Benchmarks for netlist reverse engineering?

- comparable evaluation of methods
- real-world evaluation of methods
- training data for (supervised) machine learning methods

### **Circuit Benchmarks created for:**


- EDA Optimisation
- Hardware Trojan detection
- Obfuscation / Deobfuscation

Benchmark	Type	Max Gate/Cells or (N)odes	Scalable	Modular	Synthesis	Placement	Routing
74X-series [16]	R	61		1		1	1
ISCAS'85 [17]	R	1,512					
ISCAS'89 [18]	R R	22,179				× .	× .
LGSynth'89 [19] LGSynth'91 [20]	R	4,000 35,000					
IWLS'93 [21]	R	35,000 (est.)			1		
ISPD'98 [22], [23], [24]	R	210,341			•	1	
ITC'99 [25]	R	98,726	*	1	1	1	1
Inacio et al. [26]	R	14,550		1	1	1	1
PEKO/PEKU [27]	S*	210,341			·		
IWLS'05 [28]	R	899,632	*	1	1	1	1
ISPD'05 [29]	R	2,177,353				1	1
LEKO/LEKU [30]	S*	1,166,655 (N)			1		
ISPD'06 [29]	R	2,507,954				1	1
ISPD'07 [29]	R	494,011					<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>
ISPD'08 [29]	R	2,507,954					<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>
ISPD'11 [31]	R	1,293,433				1	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>
DAC'12 [32]	R	1,364,958					
ICCAD'12 [33]	R	1,364,958				1	
ISPD'12 [34]	R	958,780				<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>	
ICCAD'13 [33]	R	1,364,958				1	
ISPD'13 [35]	R	982,258					
ICCAD'14 [33]	R	958,792					
ISPD'14 [36]	R R	1,286,948 214,335			1	1	1
EPFL'15 [37]	S	214,335			1	1	1
Matos et al. [38]	R	200,762			1	1	
ICCAD'15 [33]	R	1,931,639					
ISPD'15 [39]	R	1,286,948					
ICCAD'17 [33]	R	130,661				1	1
ISPD'18 [40]	R	290,386				1	1
ISPD'19 [41]	R	899,404				1	<ul> <li>Image: A second s</li></ul>
OPDB	R	arbitrary	/	1	/	/	/

Tziantzioulis, Georgios, Ting-Jung Chang, Jonathan Balkind, Jinzheng Tu, Fei Gao, and David Wentzlaff. "OPDB: A Scalable and Modular Design Benchmark." *IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems* 41, no. 6 (June 2022): 1878–87. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2021.3096794.




## **Details of commonly used Circuit Benchmarks**






## Benchmarks used for Obfuscation techniques and attacks from 2008 - 2020



Amir, Sarah, and Domenic Forte. "EigenCircuit: Divergent Synthetic Benchmark Generation for Hardware Security Using PCA and Linear Programming." IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, 2022, 1–1. https://doi.org/10.1109/TCAD.2022.3166675.




## Benchmarks used for Hardware Trojan methods from 2022 - 2024






## **Benchmarks used for Netlist Reverse Engineering methods from 2018 - 2023**





## **Requirements for Netlist Benchmarks**

- Comparable evaluation of methods, issues are:
  - Synthesis tool, optimisations (NDAs)
  - Technology libraries (NDAs)
  - Random methods
  - Random errors
- Real-world evaluation of methods, requires Benchmarks with:
  - Large size (1,000,000+ gates)
  - Different functionalities
  - Meaningful objective
  - Netlist and partitioning errors (1%?)
  - Module data (for partitioning)
  - Functionally correct
- Training data for machine learning methods, requires Benchmark suites with:
  - Many designs (10,000+, NDAs)
  - Large structural and functional variation
  - Labelled data (function, obfuscation, hardware Trojan)





## **Overview of proposed Netlist Reverse Engineering Benchmarks**

#### Comparable evaluation of methods, issues are:

<ul> <li>Synthesis tool, optimisations (NDAs)</li> </ul>	Open-Source EDA (QFLOW)
<ul> <li>Technology libraries (NDAs)</li> </ul>	Open-Source Technology
<ul> <li>Random methods</li> </ul>	Concrete implementation of obfuscation methods
Random errors	Concrete implementation of errors

#### Real-world evaluation of methods, requires Benchmarks with:

•	Large	size	(1,000,000-	+ gates)
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- Different functionalities
- Meaningful objective
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- Module data (for partitioning)
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Open-Source Hardware with wide range of functionalities

Error Insertion Tool

**Open-Source Hardware** 

Function / state /

obfuscation labels

Hierarchy Data

#### Netlist Formats:

- Verilog netlist (with tech data)
- Bench
- Adjlist
- Graph output

2100+ modules (from 120+ projects)

4 mio gates in largest design

Max 6 hierarchy levels



## **Next Steps**

### **1. Publication of Benchmarks**

- 2. Addition of (open-source) layout data
  - Distance based analysis
  - Realistic defect implementations

### 3. Explicit Implementations of Hardware Trojan Insertion

Automatic hardware Trojan insertion tools already exist

### 4. Support for open-source VHDL Synthesis (solved: use correct ghdl-yosys plugin)

Solved: use ghdl-yosys plugin





What else is required?

1. Real World Benchmarks

### 2. SEM Benchmarks

- First efforts exist
- Difficult due to NDAs
- Data augmentation and artificial image generation (including defect insertion)

## 3. Hardware Trojan Benchmarks for side-channel based detection

- Commonly based on simulated data
- First tests on real chip show further evaluation required

### 4. .... ?

# Contact

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